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LOVE MATTERS
Tamara L. Kuennen*

Love matters to women in abusive relationships. Consequently, matters of love
should mean something to both the legal regime redressing intimate partner
violence (“IPV”) and to feminist legal scholars seeking to reform the same.
Currently the law ignores matters of love by conditioning legal remedies on the
immediate termination of the intimate relationship by the victim.
Feminist legal scholars unwittingly ignore love by failing to be sufficiently specific
about the type of abuse we most wish to eradicate: coercive control. This is a pattern
of acts—both violent and nonviolent—in which one partner seeks to control and
dominate the personhood and liberty of another. In addition, IPV scholars
contribute to binary notions of what constitutes IPV (physical violence versus no
violence) and intimate relationships generally (abusive versus nonabusive) when we
fail to be discerning. These dichotomies mystify, rather than illuminate, the
complexity of intimate love as a context in which harm can occur, making the
coexistence of love and abuse something “other,” distant from us, our relationships,
and the law.
This Article explores where the line should be drawn between abusive and
nonabusive relationships so that the love many women experience, even in the
context of abuse, can be taken seriously. Moving the line from zero tolerance sheds
light on the normalcy of love in the context of abuse, by allowing for a more
expansive view of “normal” relationships—as often involving some use of physical
and nonphysical aggression. With a more nuanced view of the coexistence of love
and “abuse,” we can better understand love even in the context of the most serious
type of intimate partner violence: coercively controlling violence. Many women
experiencing coercive controlling violence describe the love they feel as a source of
strength and as a survival mechanism. Until feminist legal scholars expose and
accept the coexistence of love and violence in intimate relationships, our denial of
it will continue to have a profound impact on the development of explanations of
women’s experience and behavior that reflect reality, and that can fit within the
conceptual structure of the law.

*
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INTRODUCTION
Love matters to women in abusive relationships. 1 Consequently, matters of
love should mean something to both the legal regime redressing intimate partner
violence (“IPV”) and to feminist legal scholars seeking to reform the same.
Currently, the regime ignores matters of love by conditioning legal
remedies on the immediate termination of the intimate relationship by the victim. 2

1.
2.

See infra Part I.C. and accompanying notes.
See LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
THE LEGAL SYSTEM 81 (2012) (describing the evolution of domestic violence law and policy
and documenting the “demand that women subjected to abuse separate from their intimate
partners” as a “litmus test for determining whether a victim is worthy of assistance”); see also
Jeannie Suk, The Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2006) (arguing generally
that separation of the parties is the ultimate goal of the criminal response to domestic violence
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If the victim says she loves her partner, the legal system often responds: you must
not really be abused; you are partially to blame for the abuse; you are crazy; we
cannot help you.
Although feminist legal scholars have unearthed the many rational reasons
women experiencing abuse may choose to preserve, rather than sever, their intimate
relationships, we (feminist legal scholars) have ignored love as a reason for staying.
Previously, I have argued that we have done so deliberately, for strategic and
political reasons.3 This Article, however, argues that we unwittingly ignore love
when we fail to be sufficiently specific about the type of abuse we most wish to
eradicate: a pattern of acts—both violent and nonviolent—in which one partner
seeks to control and dominate the personhood and liberty of another.
The pattern is called coercive control.4 It bears little resemblance to most
states’ statutory definitions of IPV, which center on discrete acts of physical
violence. Both its prevalence and its consequence—“entrapment” of women in their
relationships—are widely misunderstood. Coercively-controlling violence accounts
for only a fraction of IPV, yet it is the image that comes to mind for most people
when they think of IPV. Women become entrapped in coercively controlling
relationships because of societal institutions that reinforce gender discrimination,
yet the public image of women experiencing abuse is that as individuals they are too
weak, passive, or helpless to leave.
The thrust of this Article is thus threefold. First, by failing to be specific
about the type of IPV we wish to target, and instead conflating coercive control with
all forms of IPV, feminist legal scholars contribute to binary notions of what
constitutes IPV (physical violence versus no violence), who is a deserving victim
(one who leaves versus one who stays), and intimate relationships generally (abusive
versus nonabusive). Second, these dichotomies mystify, rather than illuminate, the
complexity of intimate love as a context in which harm can occur, making the
coexistence of love and abuse as something “other”—distant from us (feminist legal
scholars), our relationships, and our legal system. Finally, as a result, we have
crafted a legal response that views women who wish to preserve relationships with
partners they love as incredible, blameworthy, and masochistic.
Part I of this Article demonstrates that many women and men in
“nonabusive”5 relationships think long and hard before ending their relationships.

and specifically that “prosecutors use the routine enforcement of misdemeanor DV to seek to
end (in all but name) intimate domestic relationships”).
3.
Tamara L. Kuennen, “Stuck” on Love, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 171, 178–81
(2014) [hereinafter Kuennen, Stuck].
4.
The term was coined by Susan Schechter, SUSAN SCHECHTER, GUIDELINES FOR
MENTAL HEALTH PRACTITIONERS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 4 (1987), and expanded by
Evan Stark, with whom it is now most associated. EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL AND THE
ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE (2007). Coercive control is discussed in detail
infra Part II.B.2.
5.
I believe the term “nonabusive” to be a fiction—a black-and-white
demarcation of the nature and character of relationships with which I disagree. Until I argue
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Despite having doubts, people often persist in relationships that are dissatisfying or
even hurtful; experience anguish in decision-making; hold onto hope of
reconciliation long into the breakup process; leave the relationship, return, and then
leave again; and experience prolonged feelings of attachment well after the
relationship has ended.6 This Part demonstrates that women in abusive relationships
experience much of the same. Yet, in nonabusive relationships, when people are
deciding whether to stay or leave, love is considered a legitimate factor in decisionmaking—in abusive relationships, it is not.
In Part II, the Article asks where the line should be drawn between a
nonabusive relationship and an abusive one, so that the love felt by women in
abusive relationships can be seen as a legitimate factor in stay–leave decisionmaking. Should the line be drawn where the law currently draws it—where any act
of physical aggression between partners constitutes an abusive relationship—
thereby diminishing, if not negating, love as a legitimate reason for staying? Or are
there certain amounts or types of violent acts that must occur in order for the line to
be crossed? For that matter, what constitutes violence? Is it any use of physical force
against a partner? What about destroying a partner’s property in front of her? As
observed by Martha Mahoney more than two decades ago: “It is, relatively speaking,
normal for a woman to watch a man smash up the furniture. Many of the women in
the room have seen something like it—and called it ‘marriage’ and not ‘staying.’”7
I argue that the line cannot remain where the law places it, currently making
any use of physical force the litmus test for abuse.8 The line must be moved away
from a zero-tolerance point on the continuum and toward coercively controlling
violence. I do not mean to suggest that serious, physical assaults between intimate
partners should be excused; rather, I argue that coercive control is a different and
more serious type of aggression, and as such it deserves to be measured by a different
yardstick. Currently, the law of IPV treats minor fights and coercive control the
same: a woman who slaps her partner once is as guilty of the crime of IPV as a man
who both slaps his partner once and controls her finances, employment, access to
friends, and every other aspect of her day-to-day life.9
Other scholars have argued for a more nuanced definition of IPV that
would move the line. For example, several scholars have argued that the crime of
domestic violence should include proof that the perpetrator intended to or did exert
power and control over the victim.10 The thrust of this Article is to illustrate how

this point explicitly in Part II, infra, I use the term nonabusive to describe relationships in
which no physical violence occurs.
6.
See infra Part I.B. and accompanying notes.
7.
Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue
of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (1991).
8.
STARK, supra note 4, at 83–84.
9.
GOODMARK, supra note 2, at 30 (arguing that very few states prosecute
nonphysical violence such as these types of coercive tactics).
10.
See, e.g., GOODMARK, supra note 2 at 139; Alafaire S. Burke, Domestic
Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 552 (2007); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of
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moving the line allows the law, feminist legal scholars, and the public at large to
acknowledge love as a legitimate factor in stay–leave decisions for women
experiencing types of IPV shy of coercive control. Moving the line also allows us to
meaningfully discuss the significance of love to women experiencing coercive
control. Unidirectional love within a context of domination and subjugation is
unlikely how most of us would define healthy, intimate love.11 It does not
necessarily follow, however, that the love women feel is crazy or masochistic. Here,
I rely on the work of Catharine Donovan and Marianne Hester, who argue that
women experiencing coercively controlling violence construct themselves as strong,
and that they view their love as a source of strength.12 In this way, love can be a
survival mechanism. The authors also argue, however, that the love women feel may
be a response to the coercive control itself, in which the abusive partner’s “practice
of love” is a form of emotional violence. 13 Their careful examination sheds light on
the experience of love in the context of coercive control, without diminishing it.
Part III demonstrates how feminist legal scholars, and other scholars
researching IPV, use the terms “IPV” and “coercive control” interchangeably, rather
than distinguishing between the two. 14 I wonder whether this lack of discernment
has a snowball effect. When we fail to distinguish coercive control from other forms
of IPV, we overstate its prevalence. By overstating its prevalence, we may, albeit
inadvertently, imply that all women who experience IPV are entrapped in their
relationships. And this notion—that women are entrapped—contributes to a public
story that victims of IPV would leave if only they could, if only they were not
trapped. Accordingly, legal and social-service systems designed to address IPV view
their jobs as helping women leave. Their perception, then, is that women are aberrant
when they love their partners and do not want to leave them.
Finally, Part IV draws upon the work of a handful of scholars who forge
paths that show us how legal and social interventions might change if love were
taken seriously. Legally, protection orders would allow contact between parties, but
prohibit abuse; stalking might be criminalized without requiring the parties to
formally breakup; and new remedies that facilitate women’s safety while preserving
their partnerships might be envisioned. Socially, women would be provided
counseling to decrease the current shame and stigma surrounding loving a partner
who has been abusive, and to educate women that they, like people in nonabusive
relationships, may feel love long after the breakup; shelters and other social services
Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959
(2004); Joan Erskine, Note, If it Quacks Like a Duck: Recharacterizing Domestic Violence as
Criminal Coercion, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1207 (1999).
11.
These are the remarks of Evan Stark made to me in a telephone conversation
on February 27, 2014 (notes on file with author).
12.
Catherine Donovan & Marianne Hester, ‘I Hate the Word “Victim”’: An
Exploration of Recognition of Domestic Violence in Same Sex Relationships, 9 SOC. POL’Y &
SOC’Y 279, 283 (2010), discussed infra Part II.C.
13.
Donovan & Hester, supra note 12, at 283.
14.
For example, and as will be discussed infra Part III.A., a scholar might argue
that IPV is perpetrated to obtain or maintain power and control. But, only a fraction of IPV
—what sociologists call “coercively controlling” IPV—is perpetrated for this purpose.
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would not require women to leave their partners to get help; and constructivist
modalities of service provision designed to empower women who choose to stay
would strike a better balance between their needs, desires, and rights.
In addition to offering pragmatic remedies, Part IV weighs the pros and
cons of acknowledging love in the context of abuse on theoretical, strategic, and
political levels. As summed up by Christine Littleton: “How could we possibly take
seriously women’s accounts of love and hope without undermining the little
protection from male violence women have been able to wrest from the legal system,
without indeed increasing our already overwhelming vulnerability?”15 While
acknowledging the risks, I argue that until feminist legal scholars expose and accept
the coexistence of love and aggression in intimate relationships, our denial of it will
continue to have a profound impact on the developing explanations of women’s
experiences and behaviors.16 Further, by denying the coexistence, we are less likely
to construct law that responds to this reality. Unless the law, and the judges, jurors,
and attorneys tasked with applying it, recognize the coexistence of love and
violence, stereotypical beliefs about women will continue to eclipse women’s actual
experiences; women’s decisions to preserve their relationships will never be fully
understood; and the law will continue to insist on severing the intimate partnership
as the only solution to IPV.

I. LOVE, AND HOW IT MATTERS
A. The Concept of Love
Love is a complicated thing. The struggle to define it has been taken up by
countless parties across history, from the ancient Greeks17 to contemporary
psychologists.18 The conundrum is one that has fascinated poets, philosophers,
scientists, and the popular imagination.
In a recent TED-Ed video lesson, Wisconsin high school educator Brad
Troeger posed the question thusly: “What is love? Is it a verb? A noun? A universal
truth? An ideal? The common thread of all religions? A cult? A neurological
phenomenon?”19 An experiment conducted by The Huffington Post via Twitter and
Facebook challenged readers to define love in a single word. The responses ranged
from “happiness” and “loyalty” to “work,” “uncontrollable,” “sacrifice,” and

15.
Christine A. Littleton, Women’s Experience and the Problem of Transition:
Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 47.
16.
Mahoney, supra note 7, at 13.
17.
See Donald Levy, The Definition of Love in Plato’s Symposium, 40 J. HIST. OF
IDEAS 285 (1979) (discussing and comparing the definitions of love provided by Aristotle,
Socrates and Plato).
18.
See Arthur Aron & Elaine N. Aron, Love and Sexuality, in SEXUALITY IN
CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 25–26 (Kathleen McKinney & Susan Sprecher eds., 1991) (discussing
and reviewing the social science research on love).
19.
Brad Troeger, What is Love?, http://ed.ted.com/lessons/what-is-love-bradtroeger#watch (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
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“elusive.”20 Daniel Jones, editor of The New York Times’s column “Modern Love,”
published Love, Illuminated—a book drawing upon his professional experience with
“read[ing] other people’s love stories for a living.”21 He notes (and queries):
Love is unrivaled in its power to thrill, crush, and sustain. No subject
in human history has been more thoroughly examined. And yet, as
desperately as we have tried to unlock love’s mysteries—to “decode”
it through scientific experimentation, philosophical inquiry and even
mathematical algorithms—do we really understand love any better
today than Shakespeare did nearly five hundred years ago? 22

Jones’s question is apt. In the scientific literature, love has been identified
as a biological response,23 a set of neurological phenomena,24 a cognition,25 an

20.
What is Love? 40 Words That Define It, HUFFINGTON POST (May 30, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/30/what-is-love-40-words-tha_n_3361909.html.
21.
DANIEL JONES, LOVE ILLUMINATED: EXPLORING LIFE’S MOST MYSTIFYING
SUBJECT (WITH THE HELP OF 50,000 STRANGERS) 1 (2014).
22.
Id. (front flap of book cover).
23.
See, e.g., William R. Jankowiak & Edward F. Fischer, A Cross-Cultural
Perspective on Romantic Love, 31 ETHNOLOGY 149, 149–50 (1992) (“[E]volutionary-oriented
anthropologists and psychologists have explored the possibility that romantic love constitutes
a human universal . . . . In this view romantic love centers on a biological core that is expressed
as love and enacted in courtship . . . . [This view] draws upon biochemical research that
suggests the giddiness, euphoria, optimism, and energy lovers experience in early stages of
infatuation is caused by increased levels of phenylethylamine, an amphetamine-related
compound . . . . This evolutionary perspective suggests that romantic love arises from forces
within the hominid brain that are independent of the socially constructed mind.”) (citations
omitted).
24.
Arthur Aron et al., Reward, Motivation, and Emotion Systems Associated With
Early-Stage Intense Romantic Love, 94 J. OF NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 327, 327 (2005) (study in
which participants were asked to think of their romantic partners). Although functional
magnetic resonance imaging scans showed a diverse array of activation patterns, all
participants demonstrated activation of the dopamine-rich areas of the brain which are
generally associated with deep need, focus, and addiction. Id.
25.
See generally Beverly Fehr, Prototype Analysis of the Concepts of Love and
Commitment, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 557 (1988).
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emotion,26 a behavior,27 an attitude,28 and a social construct.29 Social scientists have
identified multiple subtypes: sexual, platonic, passionate, romantic, familial, puppy,
true, unrequited, unconditional, to name but a few; the number is indefinite.30 In
addition, love is contextually dependent—any definition of it varies across culture,
class, and time.31
Given the multiple layers of love, and the multiple lenses through which
one might view it, social scientists, similar to readers of The Huffington Post,
concede that the concept is “elusive.”32 Many side-step the challenge of defining
it;33 others agree-to-disagree about it;34 and some candidly abandon altogether any
attempt to explain it.35
26.
See generally Phillip R. Shaver et al., Emotion Knowledge: Further
Exploration of a Prototype Approach, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1061 (1987); see
also Beverly Fehr & James Russell, The Concept of Love Viewed From a Prototype
Perspective, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 425, 426 (1991) (“Love can be studied as
a relationship, as an attitude, as an experience, and so on. In this article, we focus on love as
an emotion. Indeed, love is a prototypical emotion . . . .”).
27.
See Clifford H. Swensen, Jr., The Behaviors of Love, in LOVE TODAY (A. Otto
ed., 1972).
28.
Fehr & Russell, supra note 26, at 427 (reviewing divergent perspectives on
love and observing that some have “defined love as an attitude held by one person toward
another, involving a predisposition to think, feel, and behave in certain ways toward that
person”) (citation omitted); see also Stephen B. Levine, What Is Love Anyway?, 22 J. SEX &
MARITAL THERAPY 191, 198 (1996) (“Loving the partner, which originally began as an
ambition, is now closer to an attitude forged by commitment to values and persona discipline
that to mere emotion.”).
29.
See generally Anne E. Beall & Robert J. Sternberg, The Social Construction
of Love, 12 J. SOC. & PERS. RELAT. 417 (1995).
30.
Fehr & Russell, supra note 26, at 426 (“Again, the number of subcategories of
love is indefinite.”).
31.
See Beall & Sternberg, supra note 29, at 420 (“With respect to love, the social
constructionist perspective is that societies differ in their understanding of the nature of love.
Cultures in different time periods have defined love quite differently. In some time periods,
people have believed that love includes a sexual component, whereas in other eras people
have believed that it is a lofty, asexual experience. In the past two centuries, love has become
a foundation for marriage, which is a new development.”) (citations omitted).
32.
Fehr & Russell, supra note 26, at 425 (describing love as an elusive concept).
33.
Aron & Aron, supra note 18, at 25 (“There is now a fair amount of systematic
work on love, yet . . . most researchers and theorists have side-stepped defining it.”) (citation
omitted).
34.
See, e.g., SHARON S. BREHM, INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 90 (1985) (“Social
scientists have had as much trouble defining love as philosophers and poets. We have books
on love, theories on love, and research on love. Yet no one has a single, simple definition that
is widely accepted by other social scientists.”).
35.
See Beall & Sternberg, supra note 29, at 417 (“[I]t is difficult, if not
impossible, to answer the question: ‘What is love?’ because any answer must reflect its time
period and place, and in particular, the functions that romantic love serves there. More useful
questions are: ‘Why does love differ across time periods or cultures?’ or perhaps, ‘What is
the function of love for a given culture?’”); see also Levine, supra note 28 (“The same word
[love] is used to describe our pleasure in wearing a favorite sweater and our complex synthesis
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Arthur Aron and Ellen Aron argue that one common point found in social
science literature is that “love has to do with wanting to be intimate with some
individual,” and thus operationalized love as “the constellation of behaviors,
cognitions, and emotions associated with a desire to enter or maintain a close
relationship with a specific other person.”36 Professor Stephen Levine, co-director
of the Center for Marital and Sexual Health and Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at
Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine, likewise stresses the
importance of mutuality of this desire.37 He also describes love as:
[A] grand, culturally reinforced ambition energized by an
arrangement that is made between two people who make a moral
commitment to one another and then privately struggle with the
vagaries of their perceptions of the partner and the growing
dimensions of their previous commitment.38

This Article acknowledges that love is not a single feeling, cognition, or
attitude, but rather a complex interaction of often conflicting feelings informed by
culture (and subculture within that culture), the intent of the speaker, the perception
of the listener, and the relationship between the two. Further, this Article recognizes
that the interplay between, the importance of, and the very presence of passion,
friendship, commitment, understanding, and other factors that make up what people
may commonly understand as love are constantly in flux and variable. The
relationship and feelings between two people that can be labeled as “love” are
probably always evolving and changing.
Even if one’s definition of love is significantly vague, subjective, and
idiosyncratic, people report feeling “love”—however one defines it—in their
intimate relationships. And they report that falling out of love is a primary factor in
determining whether to leave these relationships, as demonstrated in the next
Subpart.
B. Love Matters in Nonabusive Relationships
Recently, in The New York Times, Daniel Jones observed:
As the editor of the Modern Love column for nearly a decade, I have
sifted through roughly 50,000 stories that have crossed my desk. I
have noticed people wrestling with two questions above all others.

of experience with a spouse of 50 years: we say we love a particular musical group and we
label the rush of emotions at our child’s wedding ceremony with the same word. It is useless
to try to delineate a singular meaning for ‘love’ in our language.”).
36.
Aron & Aron, supra note 18, at 26.
37.
See Levine, supra note 28, at 192 (discussing significance of mutual respect);
id. at 194 (“Reciprocity between two people is required to create the full intensity of falling
in love.”); id. at 198–99 (“Loving the partner rests upon our appraisal of the degree to which
mutual respect . . . exist[s] in our relationship.”). Even Plato understood the importance of a
“reciprocal exchange.” See Beall & Sternberg, supra note 29, at 425.
38.
Stephen B. Levine, What is Love Anyway?, 31 J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY
143, 145 (2005).

986

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 56:4

From the young: “How do I find love?” And from those wallowing
through marital malaise: “How do I get it back?”39

When intimate relationships become less than ideal, or less desirable than
when they were entered into, people naturally begin to question their involvement
in the relationship.40 Both women and men think long and hard before leaving their
relationships.41 Despite having doubts, people often: persist in relationships that are
dissatisfying or even hurtful;42 stay in unhappy relationships for the long-term;43
experience anguish in decision-making;44 hold hope long into the breakup process;45

39.

Daniel Jones, “Good Enough? That’s Great.” N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2014, at

ST1.
40.
Ximena B. Arriaga et al., Individual Well-Being and Relationship
Maintenance at Odds: The Unexpected Perils of Maintaining a Relationship with an
Aggressive Partner, 4 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 676, 676 (2013) (“Romantic
involvements entered by choice typically have desirable qualities. When desirable
relationships become undesirable, however, people who chose to be together may question
their involvement.”).
41.
See Gay C. Kitson et al., Withdrawing Divorce Petitions: A Predictive Test of
the Exchange Model of Divorce, 7 J. DIVORCE 51, 55 (1983) (reviewing literature and stating
couples knew their relationships were beginning to sour about three years prior to filing for
divorce, which some have called the “emotional divorce” period); see also Paul R. Amato &
Stacy J. Rogers, A Longitudinal Study of Marital Problems and Subsequent Divorce, 59 J.
MARRIAGE & FAMILY 612, 622 (1997) (observing that couples’ awareness of problems
precipitating divorce occurs 9–12 years before filing for divorce); Larry W. Taylor, The
Transition to Mid-Life Divorce, 9 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 251, 254 (2011) (analyzing the
results of a web-based survey of 581 men and 566 women who divorced at least once and
finding that the median interval for divorce deliberations is 1–2 years).
42.
Arriaga et al., supra note 40, at 676 (“Despite having some doubts, individuals
often persist in relationships that are dissatisfying or even hurtful.”) (citations omitted).
43.
Robert H. Lauer & Janice C. Lauer, Factors in Long-Term Marriages, 7 J.
FAMILY ISSUES 382, 385 (1986) (nonrandom sample of 351 couples married 15 years or longer
surveying reasons people happily and unhappily stay in long-term marriages, finding that for
those reporting unhappy marriages the belief in marriage as a long-term commitment was the
primary reason for staying together).
44.
Miriam R. Hill, Dreams to Cherish, Dreams to Grieve: An Intervention for the
Decision-Making State of Divorce Therapy, 10 J. FAMILY PSYCHOTHERAPY 49, 50 (2008)
(describing the process of deciding to divorce as filled with ambivalence, stress, inner turmoil,
power struggles, and soul searching).
45.
Alan J. Hawkins et al., Reasons for Divorce and Openness to Marital
Reconciliation, 53 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 453, 458 (2012) (surveying 886 individual
divorcing parents after mandated parenting class, finding 26% of respondents still hoped for
reconciliation and believed the marriage could be saved even at a late stage in the process).
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separate and reunite before deciding to stay46 or to leave;47 and experience prolonged
feelings of attachment,48 grief, and mourning.49
Large-scale longitudinal studies demonstrate that, despite the presence of
conflict and violence in relationships, neither conflict nor violence is necessarily the
primary reason that people decide to terminate their relationships. For example, in
one longitudinal study of divorcing couples in the mid-1980s, out of a 27-factor list,
the two most commonly cited reasons for divorce were “gradual growing apart,
losing feelings of closeness,” and “not feeling loved and appreciated.”50
Additionally, while a clear majority of respondents reported high levels of conflict
and tension during their marriage, “feelings of emotional barrenness and boredom
with the marriage” were cited far more frequently as a primary causes of divorce.51
As the authors noted, these finding bore a striking similarity to two other
large-scale studies conducted 5 and 15 years prior, in which “growing apart” and
“feeling unloved” were frequently mentioned factors in divorce decision-making.52
The earlier large-scale studies concluded that:
Whereas before, divorce was a solution more often limited to such
stark and specific circumstances as desertion or chronic alcoholism,
in the mid-[19]80s, divorce appears to be most commonly sought
because of a more general dissatisfaction with the emotional or
affective deficiencies and tenor of the marital relationship. As
indicated elsewhere, a substantial number of these divorces were not

46.
Regina L. Donovan & Barry L. Jackson, Deciding to Divorce: A Process
Guided by Social Exchange, Attachment and Cognitive Dissonance Theories, 13 J. OF
DIVORCE 23, 24 (1990) (noting that “[m]any people who are dissatisfied or unhappy in
marriage or who separate from their spouses do not ultimately divorce. More than 20% of the
divorce petitions filed are retracted each year . . . . And finally there are an untold number of
informal separations in which the spouses simply cease to live as a married couple. Such
informal separations are considered to be quite frequent.”) (citations omitted).
47.
Kitson et al., supra note 41, at 52 (finding that 44% of a court record-based
survey (N=209) withdrew their petitions).
48.
William H. Berman, Continued Attachment After Legal Divorce, 6 J. FAMILY
ISSUES 375, 375 (1985) (“[A]t least 25% of the divorced population have significant difficulty
completing the psychological divorce and remain attached to their ex-spouses for significant
periods of time.”).
49.
Cathleen A. Gray & Joseph J. Shields, The Development of an Instrument to
Measure the Psychological Response to Separation and Divorce, 17 J. DIVORCE &
REMARRIAGE 43, 44 (1992) (describing mourning for the loss of the relationship).
50.
Lynn Gigy & Joan B. Kelly, Reasons for Divorce: Perspectives of Divorcing
Men and Women, 18 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 169, 173 (1993).
51.
Id. at 183.
52.
Id. at 184 (citing Koch-Nielsen & Lone Gundelach, Women at Divorce, in THE
AFTERMATH OF DIVORCE: COPING WITH FAMILY CHANGE: AN INVESTIGATION IN EIGHT
COUNTRIES 99–121 (Akademiai Kiado ed., 1985); Joan B. Kelly, Divorce: The Adult
Perspective, in HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 734–50 (Benjamin B. Wolman
& George Stricker eds., 1982)).
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characterized by extreme anger, retaliatory behaviors, or a serious
breakdown in communication and cooperation.53

Recent data indicate the same. For example, in 2012, after reviewing the
body of research on reasons people file for divorce, Hawkins et al. concluded that
“most divorces are initiated because of problems such as falling out of love,
changing personal needs, lack of satisfaction, and feelings of greater entitlement,
especially for more educated individuals, whereas severe problems such as abuse
and addiction are noted less frequently.”54 The authors concluded that a number of
breakups might be prevented without threat to the health and safety of the couple,
and that there is more potential to repair relationships than is often assumed.55
Indeed, a number of researchers suggest that we as a society might do more
through social policy and public education to encourage intimate partners—
particularly those who are married—to work things out and to stay together.56
Paul Amato, a leading sociologist in the study of marital quality and causes
of divorce, advocates for the preservation of “good enough” marriages.57 He argues
that, where conflict is at a low- or even medium-level but is not abusive, such
partnerships are good enough, from the point of view of the children involved.58
Daniel Jones59 also explores the concept of good enough marriages.60 Jones
advocates for good enough marriages from a spouse’s perspective rather than a
child’s; accordingly, good enough requires distinguishing between the loss of
passion and the loss of love.61 When love remains, the relationship is good enough.
And, as the title of Jones’s column indicates, good enough is, actually, great.62

53.
Id. at 186.
54.
Hawkins et al., supra note 45, at 453.
55.
Id. at 454.
56.
Id. (arguing that the results of their literature review and data showed that the
most common factors that contribute to seeking a divorce are the ones most amenable to
intervention, and citing three additional sources finding the same, and advocating for policies
encouraging couples to work things out) (citations omitted).
57.
Paul R. Amato, Good Enough Marriages: Parental Discord, Divorce, and
Children’s Long-Term Well-Being, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 71 (2001).
58.
Id. at 71 (“Children’s adjustment to divorce depends upon the level of discord
between parents prior to disruption. When discord is high, divorce appears to benefit children,
but when discord is low, divorce appears to harm children. Low discord marriages that end
in divorce represent ‘good enough’ marriages from a child’s perspective. Because relations
between spouses in these marriages are generally positive, the potential for reconciliation is
considerable. Attempts should be made to screen these couples prior to marital dissolution
and provide appropriate educational and support services.”).
59.
Jones’s quotation began this Subpart. See JONES supra note 21.
60.
The concept of “good enough” love is similarly discussed by Professor Levine.
See Levine, supra note 28, at 193 (“When the buffering system [defense mechanisms for
distress in relationships] works, one’s love, while not continuously or completely harmonious,
may be felt as good enough.”).
61.
Jones, supra note 39.
62.
Id.
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In sum, both popularly and scientifically, there is a large and growing body
of data illustrating that when love exists, intimate relationships should not be
abandoned, if those relationships are nonabusive.
C. Love Matters in Abusive Relationships
In stark contrast, both popularly and scientifically, the question “why does
she stay?” is the most pervasive question asked in the context of abusive
relationships.63 Indeed, “battered women who stay” are viewed as a deviant group.64
The question “why does she stay?” might seem rhetorical at first blush. If
a partner is causing physical and emotional pain, it is intuitive to think that leaving
the partner would end that pain. Alas, for years social scientists have documented
that leaving puts many women65 at risk for heightened, and even lethal, violence at
the hands of their former partners.66 We know this because women do not, in fact,
always stay. To the contrary, around 80% of women leave abusive partners at least
once.67 Statistics show that women living apart from their abusive partners are more
likely to be abused than married or cohabiting women.68
Yet researchers continue to be preoccupied with the question of why
women stay, and with figuring out how to get them to leave. For example, a 2013
63.
See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING
77–79 (2000) (concisely explaining how the question is asked popularly); see also Mahoney,
supra note 7, at 15 (arguing that most of us do not think of ourselves as “staying” in our
current relationships; rather, we think of ourselves as “being” in our current relationships and
discussing the problems with the word “stay” to describe women in abusive relationships
versus women, and men, generally in their relationships, and asking: “Do we ‘stay’ or are we
simply married?”). For an excellent discussion of how the question of staying has influenced
the collection of empirical data amongst social scientists, see Einat Peled, et al., Choice and
Empowerment for Battered Women Who Stay: Toward a Constructivist Model, 45 SOCIAL
WORK 9, 10–11 (2000) (critiquing three themes in the literature that purport to explain the
“so-called problem of battered women who stay” as: (1) the inaccurate assumption that
separation from the abuser terminates the violence; (2) theories that women’s psychological
makeup, relationship skills, and personal and situation factors contribute to their entrapment
in destructive and dysfunctional relationships; and (3) theories that patriarchal notions
regarding gender roles and nonsupportive formal and informal social networks, along with
economic dependency and lack of alternative housing explain women’s entrapment).
64.
Peled et al., supra note 63, at 9 (arguing there exists a category of women
called “battered women who stay” and observing that these women “often are characterized
as incompetent, weak, and lacking coping skills, which further engulf them in the victim role
and contribute to their powerlessness.”) (citation omitted).
65.
But not all women experiencing violence in their relationships are at
heightened risk when they leave their partners. It depends upon the type of violence. For
example, women involved in “fights” may not be at the same risk as women involved in
“coercive control.” See infra Part III.A (discussing the varying types of IPV).
66.
Martha Mahoney coined the term “separation assault” to describe this
phenomenon. See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 6.
67.
STARK, supra note 4, at 115.
68.
Id. at 91 (noting that men are also more likely to be assaulted by female
partners if they are living separately rather than cohabiting).
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study ultimately concluded: “Perhaps when an abused woman feels understood
about her love for her abusive partner she will be more perceptive to learning about
mutual mature love, thus increasing her likelihood of leaving the relationship.”69
The misconceptions that women always stay, and are in more danger by
staying, along with the preoccupation with victims’ conduct rather than with
perpetrators’ conduct, long have been the subjects of IPV-related feminist
scholarship. Evan Stark’s observation concisely captures the general tone of this
body of work: “It’s the Men, Dummy . . . . [I]t is the men who stay, not their partners.
Regardless of whether their dependence on their partner is primarily material,
sexual, or emotional, there is no greater challenge in the abuse field than getting men
to exit from abusive relationships.”70
Putting the question of whether it is physically safe for a woman to leave
an abusive relationship aside momentarily, data show that a primary reason women
stay in abusive relationships is for love.71
69.
Marilyn Smith et al., Intimate Partner Violence and the Meaning of Love, 34
ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 395, 400 (2013).
70.
STARK, supra note 4, at 130 (emphasis in original).
71.
See Donovan & Hester, supra note 12, at 283 (conducting a national
community survey in Great Britain, obtaining 746 useable questionnaires; conducting focus
groups and interviewing 67 respondents, 44 of whom self-identified as lesbian/gay/bisexual
or queer and 23 heterosexual; and not naming “domestic violence” as the topic of the study
but rather “what happens when things go wrong in relationships”; finding “love for a partner
and hope for the future of the relationship are amongst key reasons given by people in
heterosexual and same sex relationships for staying in or returning to domestically violent
relationships”); see also Sascha Griffing et al., Domestic Violence Survivors’ Self-Identified
Reasons for Returning to Abusive Relationships, 17 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 306, 313
(2002) (conducting structured interviews of 90 female residents of an urban domestic violence
shelter, with all respondents identifying as African American, Latina or Caribbean; finding
that 73.3% of the respondents who previously left their partners in the past reported that
emotional attachment would be an influential factor in their decision-making about whether
to return in the future); Margaret H. Kearney, Enduring Love: A Grounded Formal Theory of
Women’s Experience of Domestic Violence, 24 RESEARCH IN NURSING & HEALTH 270, 271
(2001) (reviewing 13 qualitative studies between 1984 and 1999, which created a sample of
282 ethnically and geographically diverse women between ages 16–67, hypothesizing the
concept “enduring love” and illustrating a primary reason women stayed or returned to violent
relationships was a “continued emotional bond and hope for a return to a better time in the
relationship”); Jennifer Langhinrichsen-Rohling, Top 10 Greatest “Hits”: Important
Findings and Future Directions for Intimate Partner Violence Research, 20 J. INTERPERS.
VIOLENCE 108, 114 (2005) (reviewing literature of the past decade and finding that “one of
the main reasons that physically victimized married women give for staying is love – rather
than fear or obstacles for leaving such as money or children”); CLAIRE M. RENZETTI, VIOLENT
BETRAYAL: PARTNER ABUSE IN LESBIAN RELATIONSHIPS 77 (1992); Anna Aizer & Pedro Dal
Bo, Love, Hate and Murder: Commitment Devices in Violent Relationships, 93 J. PUBLIC
ECON. 412 (2009); Arriaga et al., supra note 40; Ola W. Barnett, Why Battered Women Do
Not Leave, Part 2: External Inhibiting Factors – Social Support and Internal Inhibiting
Factors, 2 TRAUMA VIOLENCE ABUSE 3, 9 (2001); Pamela Choice & Leanne K. Lamke, A
Conceptual Approach to Understanding Abused Women’s Stay/Leave Decisions, 18 J.
FAMILY ISSUES 290 (1997); James C. Roberts et al., Why Victims of Intimate Partner Violence
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Notably, these data suggest that women in abusive relationships care a lot
about the same things that women, and men, in nonabusive relationships care about.
Like people in nonabusive relationships, women who experience abuse feel a deep
sense of commitment to their partners72 and, like people in nonabusive relationships,
women in abusive relationships feel hope that their relationships can work out even
during late stages of the emotional and psychological breakup period.73
D. Matters of Love are Illegitimate in Abusive Relationships
Leigh Goodmark persuasively makes the case that there is a paradigmatic
domestic-abuse victim that exists in legal actors’ (police, judges, and jurors)
psyches, and that victim desperately wants to leave her intimate relationship but is
powerless to do so.74
When the justice system comes across a woman who does not fit this mold,
it offers almost no solutions. Restraining orders, the most widely used civil legal
remedy, prevent any contact between the parties and thus are practicable only if the
woman wants to separate.75 If a woman calls the police for help, most state statutes
strongly encourage, if not require, the police to arrest the perpetrator.76 If criminal
charges are filed, the court issues a criminal restraining order that prohibits contact
between the parties.77 If a district attorney decides to move forward with criminal
charges, many jurisdictions follow policies that assure that cases will be prosecuted
regardless of the woman’s wishes.78 In short, separation is the justice system’s
solution to the problem of IPV.79
Women experiencing abuse are considered blameworthy or masochistic
when they want to preserve their intimate relationships. 80 Particularly when their

Withdraw Protection Orders, 23 J. FAM. VIOL. 369 (2008); Caryl E. Rusbult & John M. Martz,
Remaining in an Abusive Relationship: An Investment Model Analysis of Nonvoluntary
Dependence, 21 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 558 (1995); Smith et al., supra note 69,
at 395.
72.
See Aizer & Dal Bo, supra note 71.
73.
Id.; Donovan & Hester, supra note 12, at 282; see Kearney, supra note 71, at
275.
74.
GOODMARK, supra note 2, at 63–70 (2012) (Goodmark titles this subsection of
her book The Paradigmatic Victim and Her Non-Conforming Sisters).
75.
Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic
Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1487 (2008).
76.
GOODMARK, supra note 2, at 110.
77.
Suk, supra note 2.
78.
Tamara L. Kuennen, Private Relationships and Public Problems: Applying
Principles of Relational Contract Theory to Domestic Violence, 2010 BYU L. REV. 515, 592
[hereinafter Relational Contracts] (discussing appendix setting forth jurisdictions claiming to
follow no-drop prosecution policies).
79.
Suk, supra note 2, at 8.
80.
Kuennen, Relational Contracts, supra note 78, at 587 (citing the feminist legal
literature on point).
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desire is based, even partially, on love, it is viewed as maladaptive and even
pathological.81
These views, combined with empirical data indicating the importance of
love to abused women, would lead one to think that feminist legal scholars would
be interested in constructing a legal response to IPV that accounts for love. Yet by
and large, this is not the case.82 In past decades, feminists dismissed love in the
context of abuse as a product of false consciousness or gender-role socialization.83
Even cultural feminists, who controversially argue that relationships and
connections are uniquely important to women, have supported a legal regime that
dismisses love.84
There are important strategic and political reasons for these feminist
responses, as discussed infra Part V. In this Part, I am interested in the body of legal
scholarship that argues in favor of legal reform that accounts for the many pragmatic
reasons women choose to stay with abusive partners (putting aside the strategic and
political). This body of work avoids love as a reason for staying. 85 On the rare
occasions when we (and I include myself specifically) as legal scholars acknowledge
the concept of love, we rarely use the word love in our writing. Rather, we opt for
more clinical, sanitized terms. Instead of love, scholars use terms such as
“connection” and “emotional attachment.”86 Previously I have observed:

81.
GOODMARK, supra note 2, at 98 (“Love becomes pathology . . . a problem to
solve so that women subjected to abuse can be cast in a sympathetic light . . . and so that her
problems can be addressed in the legal system’s preferred manner, through separation.
Because, of course, if a woman stays with her partner out of love, the domestic violence
service system has very little to offer her.”); id. at 99–100 (“Love as pathology reaches its
apex with the concept of traumatic bonding.”).
82.
See Kuennen, Stuck, supra note 3, at 171. There are a handful of exceptions
where love is meaningfully explored as a reason for staying in a violent relationship. See
GOODMARK, supra note 2, at 63–70; Katharine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse, 110
YALE L.J. 1459, 1474–75 (2001) (“[Women] do not necessarily want to be in a position where
they can just leave. They want to be in relationships in which they forgive. They may even
want to be in relationships that involve some relinquishment of self, autonomy, and power.
And what is more, they are not alone. Women who are not in battering relationships and men
who do not batter want these kinds of relationships too.”) (footnotes omitted); Mahoney,
supra note 7, at 19–21 (observing that women’s response to violence in a relationship relies
on numerous goals: their experience of the violence, economic security, love of partner, and
view of life outside of the relationship, among others). See generally Cheryl Hanna,
Rethinking Consent in a Big Love Way, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 111 passim (2010).
83.
Kuennen, Stuck, supra note 3, at 176.
84.
Aya Gruber, NeoFeminism, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1325, 1354 (2013) (“Yet it
seems that when it comes to how the state should deal with violent men, even cultural
feminists reject caring and cooperation. They do not universally or even generally support
continued intimacy with abusers . . . .”) (citations omitted).
85.
I wonder if our feminist legal scholars’ discomfort with love has as much to
do with our inability to explain it in the context of coercive control as it has to do with politics
and strategy. I discuss love in the context of coercive control in Part II.C., infra.
86.
See, e.g., Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution
Policies: Prioritizing Victims’ Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence
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To fully appreciate the degree of discomfort such sanitized words
display, one need only imagine saying, “I feel emotionally attached
to you,” or “I am deeply connected to you,” rather than, “I love you,”
to one’s spouse or partner before hanging up the phone or turning in
for the evening. Or imagine explaining to someone outside of the
relationship how you feel about your partner by saying: “I feel very
emotionally connected to her.”87

Our scholarship tiptoes around, and even apologizes for, the fact that
women in abusive relationships may love their partners, 88 suggesting that we resign
ourselves to “accept” the reality that the women we are advocating for do, indeed,
love their partners.89
In nonabusive relationships, it is a norm for women (and men) to make
decisions about their intimate relationships based on love, particularly when
deciding whether to end their intimate relationships.90 The question, then, is how do
we as a society draw the line between abusive and nonabusive relationships so as to

Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 476–79, 493 (2003) (describing in detail
the multiple “[r]elational [f]actors” that go into a woman’s decision-making regarding
whether to preserve the relationship, using “emotional connection” and “emotional
attachment,” though mentioning the word love one time, “a woman may love her partner but
also be afraid of him”); Goldfarb, supra note 75, at 1500 (describing “mutual emotional
commitment, companionship, intimacy, and sharing,” but never using the word love)
(emphasis added); Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and
Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1113–14 (2009) (“The
current [civil protection order] laws are particularly well situated to permit petitioners to
construct a remedy that redefines a relationship that is tainted by abuse but nonetheless is
meaningful—connected by children, economics, emotional, and psychological ties.”)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted); Kuennen, Relational Contracts, supra note 78, at 537
(“A victim may choose to stay in a relationship that she knows is dangerous because the
intimate connection is worth the risk.”) (emphasis added).
87.
Kuennen, Stuck, supra note 3, at 175.
88.
See GOODMARK, supra note 2, at 98 (“The domestic violence literature tiptoes
carefully around the concept of love. The literature accepts the idea that some women
subjected to abuse do, in fact, continue to say that they love their partners despite the abuse.
But the literature explains this love away, almost apologizing for the desire of women to
continue their relationships.”).
89.
See, e.g., LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED
WOMEN: A SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE
90 (2008) (“We need to ensure that every battered woman has the opportunity and ability to
leave her relationship, receives sufficient counseling to make the most independent choice
possible, and is fully informed about available alternatives. But we also need to understand
and accept that some women will decide to continue a connection with an abusive
partner . . . .”) (emphasis added); Goldfarb, supra note 75, at 1500–01 (describing the
multidimensional emotions that abusive relationships produce, such as “mutual emotional
commitment, companionship, intimacy, and sharing,” and thus concluding that the aspiration
of many women to remain with their partners “should not be dismissed as naïve or
misguided”) (emphasis added).
90.
See discussion supra Part I.B; see also notes 50–55.
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recognize staying for love as a legitimate reason to stay, rather than writing it off as
maladaptive?

II. DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN ABUSIVE AND NONABUSIVE
RELATIONSHIPS
This Part explores a continuum of aggression in intimate partnerships and
analyzes the usefulness of lines that have been drawn regarding what types or levels
of aggression are deemed acceptable, versus not. Subpart A provides a specific
definition of the word “abusive,” which I have used loosely thus far in this Article.
Subpart B relies heavily upon the work of two leading sociologists in the field: Evan
Stark91 and Michael Johnson,92 both of whom discern among different types of
aggression that occur in intimate relationships.
Both view coercive control as qualitatively different from other forms of
IPV, and both estimate the prevalence of coercive control to be significantly lower
than other forms of aggression in intimate relationships.
Relying on the work of Stark and Johnson, I argue in Subpart C that if the
line between abusive and nonabusive relationships were moved away from a zerotolerance point on the continuum—where law and policy currently draw it—and
toward a type of IPV that Stark and Johnson call “coercive control,” law and policy
could acknowledge love as a legitimate factor in stay–leave decisions for the
majority of women who report IPV, i.e., those who report types of aggression in
their relationships far shy of coercive control. It also allows us to discuss the
significance of love to women experiencing coercive control, which I do in the
conclusion to this Part.
A. Nomenclature
So far in this Article I have used the terms “intimate partner violence” and
“abuse” loosely to describe any act or array of aggression that might come to mind
when one thinks of these concepts. From here on out, I will be more precise in my
terminology.
For the purposes of this Part, and in the rest of the Article, I will continue
to use the term “intimate partner violence” (or IPV) to mean the same: any form of
aggression, physical or nonphysical,93 between intimate partners. However, I will
91.
Stark’s breakdown of the types of aggression used by people who are or have
been in intimate relationships employs terminology that I find to be accessible because of its
lay, rather than clinical, nature. As I will discuss, once a “zero tolerance” for any physical
aggression in relationships is abandoned, which I argue it should be, we can—and Stark
does—discern between “fights,” “assaults,” and “coercive control” in relationships.
92.
Michael Johnson’s typologies of intimate partner violence are more clinical in
nature, but because they are increasingly used in the field and are gaining traction, I briefly
review them. I then summarize the points upon which Johnson’s and Stark’s works diverge
before focusing on two critical points where they agree.
93.
Nonphysical aggression might include verbal degradation, threats,
intimidation, the “silent treatment,” and any other imaginable act of aggression shy of the use
of physical force.
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use the word “abusive” to mean a level of aggression that is a tipping point between
what is acceptable conduct in a relationship and what is not, i.e., “abusive conduct”
refers to unacceptably aggressive conduct.
As we shall see, there are many types of aggression, both physical and
nonphysical, that may fall under the umbrella of IPV, but whether one interprets
them as abusive is a point of controversy and confusion.
B. Places We Could Draw the Line
1. Zero Tolerance for IPV
In society and in scholarship, “zero tolerance” is a prevalent view for how
to treat IPV. Politicians exclaim this.94 Public agencies tout this.95 Advocates for
battered women make this their mission.96 Some feminist scholars argue this: “Too
many people do not know that the only sharp line that matters, and should matter, in
domestic relations, is between violence and nonviolence, not between bad violence
and okay violence. No level of violence is acceptable; none should be tolerated.”97
An initial, analytical problem with zero tolerance for IPV is the lack of
clarity regarding what counts as violence. In accord with a common dictionary

94.
See, e.g., G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic
Violence and the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV.
237, 238 (2005) (“With the death of Nicole Brown, politicians raced to the state house to
invoke domestic violence laws, jumping on the ‘zero tolerance’ bandwagon.”); John Sanko,
Stopping Domestic Violence: Lawmakers Take Approach of Zero Tolerance As they Support
Bill, Revamp Laws, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 15, 1994, at 5A (statement of Rep. Diana
DeGette, Colo.) (“We’ve basically completely revamped domestic-violence laws in Colorado
. . . . The message to citizens is ‘We’re taking a zero tolerance in this type of activity.’ People
who beat up their spouses, girlfriends or boyfriends are going to be punished swiftly and
severely.”).
95.
See, e.g., Jay R. Rooth, Credibility Strategies for an Incredible Defense, in
STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 50 (2012) (“Many local agencies in
Florida have a zero tolerance policy, i.e., if law enforcement responds to a 911 call and it
involves domestic violence, they must make an arrest.”); see also Contra Coast County Board
of Supervisors, ZERO TOLERANCE FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.contracostazt.org/
(last visited Sept. 29, 2014) (“‘Zero Tolerance for Domestic Violence,’ an initiative of the
Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors, is a public/private partnership designed to reduce
domestic violence, family violence, elder abuse, and human trafficking in Contra Costa
County. Authorized by the California Legislature as the first Zero Tolerance for Domestic
Violence County . . . the initiative is aligning policies, practices and protocols, coordinating
services, and creating a climate where violence and abuse are not tolerated.”)
96.
See, e.g., SANCTUARY FOR FAMILIES ZERO TOLERANCE BENEFIT,
http://www.probono.net/ny/family/calendar/event.427815-Sanctuary_for_Families_Zero_
Tolerance_Benefit_2012 (last visited September 23, 2014) (naming its annual benefit after
zero tolerance).
97.
See ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 209 (1997) (emphases in original); see
also BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 120 (South End Press 2d ed.
2000) (“Viewing male violence against women in personal relationships is one of the most
blatant expressions of the use of abusive force to maintain domination and control.”).
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definition, violence is “the use of physical force to harm someone, to damage
property, etc.”98 At first blush, the definition appears to be straightforward.
Advocates of a zero-tolerance approach argue that any use of physical force is
abusive.99 The law currently draws the same line. 100
But let us return to the question posed by Martha Mahoney in this Article’s
Introduction: is smashing up furniture in the presence of one’s partner an act of
violence? Proponents of zero tolerance would argue that it is, and the common
dictionary definition would support this position as well. But, if that is the case, and
if Mahoney’s observation that “it is, relatively speaking, normal for a woman to
watch her husband destroy the furniture”101 is correct, are not most women in this
country victims of IPV?
Perhaps zero-tolerance policies are meant to address only violence directed
at a person, so that smashing the furniture would not count as violence. But if that
is the case, what if the furniture smashing were done for the purpose of intimidating
the witness? Surely the intent of the perpetrator and the effect on the witness are
important factors.
Finally, a zero-tolerance policy’s emphasis on violence underappreciates
nonphysical conduct, such as intimidation or coercion. Is a woman not a victim of
IPV if her partner has never laid a hand on her but instead controls her money, limits
her access to her family, and/or degrades her on a daily basis? “Violence is a
distinctive behavior with a special link to injury, pain, and other forms of suffering.
By subsuming all forms of abuse to violence, we conflate the multiple layers of
women’s oppression in personal life, making nonviolent abusive acts seem highly
subjective or soft core.”102
While zero tolerance has the strategic advantages of any sound bite, it is
more confounding than clarifying as a social policy. It does not sufficiently move
forward our understanding of the tipping point between behaviors that we might
deem abusive. Martha Mahoney argued that abuse should be defined as a continuum
of domination, in which the focus should be the perpetrator’s intent.103 Sociologist

98.
This is the first full definition of violence in the Merriam-Webster online
dictionary. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/violence (last
visited March 11, 2014).
99.
See supra text accompanying note 8.
100.
GOODMARK, supra note 2, at 40 (observing that the law prohibits the use of
physical violence and criticizing it for not including other types of aggression; only Nevada
and Rhode Island define criminal domestic violence more broadly but even in these states the
focus is on physical violence).
101.
Mahoney, supra note 7.
102.
STARK, supra note 4, at 86.
103.
Mahoney, supra note 7, at 56 (describing “battering” as a (violent) point on a
continuum of domination in relationships; she argues that the intent of the perpetrator should
be the focus).
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Evan Stark comes closest to doing just that in his discernment between fights,
assaults, and coercive control.104
2. Stark’s Typologies: Fights, Assaults, and Coercive Control
a. Fights
Large-scale national surveys show that respondents report very high rates
of IPV when they are asked to catalog any instances of force used to resolve conflicts
in their relationships.105 In addition, these surveys find that “mutual violence,”106
where both men and women use force in relationships, is the most common dynamic
in couples.107
Many people in relationships believe that some use of physical force is not
only an acceptable way to resolve conflict, but that it is a legitimate way to resolve
conflict.108 Stark defines a “fight” as force that is used between relative equals, does
not exceed community norms or the scope of the grievance, and does not cause
serious injury.109 On that basis, Stark argues that fights have been mistakenly and
problematically equated with abuse. 110 To distinguish abuse from fights, Stark
argues, “it is necessary to know not merely what a party does—their behavior—but
its context, its sociopolitical as well as its physical consequence, its meaning to the
parties involved, and particularly to its target(s) and whether and how it is combined
with other tactics.”111

104.
Though I note that Stark views coercive control as qualitatively different from
fights and assaults, he does not exactly provide us a “continuum.”
105.
STARK, supra note 4, at 89.
106.
Id. at 92.
107.
Id. (noting that it is “incontrovertible that large numbers of women use force
in relationships” and that the type of force women use includes the types of force classified
as severe or abusive).
108.
See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607–09 (2000) (arguing that the average juror believes that
some amount of violence within an intimate relationship is acceptable, and thus might be
disinclined to convict in the case of intimate partner violence, and calling this a sticky norm
that is not going to be easily changed by feminist law reforms reflecting values not yet adopted
by society at large).
109.
STARK, supra note 4, at 105 (describing fights as: (1) occurring between
“relative equals”; (2) having some element of reciprocity; (3) bearing proportionality to the
grievance; and (4) not violating what the community regards as a legitimate way to address
differences).
110.
Id. at 85 (“The equation of abuse with physical force in relationships has
helped the domestic violence revolution access a range of professional and political agendas.
But it has failed victimized women in critical ways . . . . Although everyone purports to be
measuring the same phenomenon, the picture that emerges . . . differs dramatically depending
on whether persons are asked about conflict, crime, or safety concerns . . . . One source of
confusion is indecision about whether any and all use of force in relationships should be
counted as violence.”).
111.
Id. at 104.
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Turning again to Mahoney’s scenario, perhaps smashing up furniture is an
acceptable way to resolve a conflict in a relationship. Applying Stark’s definition, it
does not necessarily exceed community norms—as stated by Mahoney, many
women have witnessed it. Other examples may include the slamming of a door or
the smashing of dishes. Or perhaps screaming an insult at another. None of these
occurrences between partners causes bodily injury. But, without more information,
we do not know the consequence on the witness, or whether it exceeded the scope
of the grievance.
Let us assume first that the person doing the smashing struck out in anger
or exasperation rather than to intimidate or control his partner, or that the witness
did not feel threatened or fearful. This situation would be, according to Stark,
analytically distinct from a second situation, one in which the nonviolent partner
was afraid to move or respond.112
Mahoney observes that feminists’ accounts of lesbian battering make
precisely these distinctions. Situations in which someone struck out in anger but did
not hit hard, or in which they hit again but there was no effective intimidation, would
not rise to the level of “battering.”113 However, “battering” would include “the times
the furniture was smashed up and threats uttered, and the nonviolent partner was
afraid to move or respond.”114 Adding these factors—the purpose of the use of force
and the effect on the target—advances our ability to discern between abusive and
nonabusive aggression in relationships. 115
b. Assaults
Unlike fights, which are used to resolve conflict, assaults are used to
suppress conflict.116 In assaults, “dominance is accomplished through raw power
alone, forcing a partner to apply a calculus of physical pain and suffering to reassess
112.
I rely here upon Stark’s general analytical framework for distinguishing fights,
assaults, and coercive control, which is most succinctly captured in Id. at 104–06.
113.
Mahoney, supra note 7, at 33.
114.
Id.
115.
In addition to the work of Stark and Mahoney, a number of judges, lawyers,
and scholars have recognized the importance of a contextual approach to understanding
aggression between partners. See generally Nancy Ver Steegh & Claire Dalton, Report from
the Wingspread Conference on Domestic Violence and Family Courts, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 454
(2008); id. at 456–57 (“Consider the situation where partner A slaps partner B. First imagine
that when the incident takes place there is no prior history of physical violence or of other
abusive behaviors between A and B. Then imagine that, although this incident is the first
instance of physical violence, A has previously undermined B’s efforts to seek employment,
denigrated B’s parenting in front of the children, and isolated B from her family and friends.
Then imagine a situation where A broke B’s nose the week before and A is threatening to kill
B and harm their children. The act of slapping is the same in each situation but the impact
and consequences are very different.”). For a concise summary of this body of literature, see
Jane Wangmann, Different Types of Intimate Partner Violence–An Exploration of the
Literature, AUSTRALIAN DOMESTIC & FAMILY VIOLENCE CLEARINGHOUSE ISSUES PAPER 22
(October 2011).
116.
STARK, supra note 4, at 377.
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the benefits of past or future behavior, including resistance. In assaults, only one
party can win.”117 Additionally, unlike in fights, assaults’ “targets feel assaulted, and
their means, consequence or frequency are so disproportionate to the grievances
involved that they violate what the community regards as a legitimate way to address
differences.”118
Stark again cites the longitudinal, national surveys to support his distinction
between fights and assaults. In those surveys, when asked about being hit, almost
none of the men and only a tiny proportion of the women indicated that they required
outside assistance.119 These folks are talking about fights.120
Stark argues that people who indicate that they have sought outside
assistance in crime and safety surveys are likely talking about assaults. Their
partners’ actions violated their community norms to the extent that they anticipated
that outsiders would view their grievance as legitimate, and would help them.121 “As
a practical matter,” Stark argues, “applying a sheer calculus of means and harms to
a history of force in relationships can usually distinguish fights from assaults.”122
Both women and men assault their partners. While the body of research on
women’s assaults of men is small, it shows that women assault their partners in the
same context, and with similar motives and consequences, as men.123
Are assaults abusive? It depends upon the purpose of the perpetrator and
the effect on the victim. In discussing his female clients, Stark noted that many “see
violence as a legitimate way to stand up for themselves, maintain their self-respect,
and to demonstrate that assaulting them has a cost.”124 In this scenario, the intent of
the perpetrator is one of leveling rather than controlling.
On the other hand, what if the victim felt controlled, even if this was not
the perpetrator’s intent? Or what if the effect of the assault was a very serious injury?
Stark concedes that differentiating between assaults and the next category of
aggression—coercive control—is tricky business.125 According to Stark, the key is
the intent of the perpetrator to dominate and control his or her partner. If a specific

117.
Id. at 105.
118.
Id. (explaining why distinguishing fights from assaults is straightforward).
119.
Id.
120.
Id. (concluding that, in the large, national surveys, “a good number of these
[reported] assaults occur in the context of fights, a possibility that is supported by the extent
to which couples report mutual violence”).
121.
Id. (arguing that the “majority of those who report abuse to crime or safety
surveys have sought outside assistance, suggesting they are primarily victims of assault or
worse”).
122.
Id. at 106.
123.
Id. at 99.
124.
Id.
125.
Id. at 105.
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assault is part of a larger pattern of ongoing tactics used coercively to control
another, it tips for him into the realm of abusive. 126
c. Coercive Control
The aim of coercive control is dominance, not to cause physical harm. This
point is fundamental. Coercive control targets autonomy, liberty, and personhood.127
Its tactics are broad and insidious, well beyond the use of physical aggression alone.
The tactics, as observed by women’s advocates and Stark, include: restricting access
to money, family, and friends; threatening to commit suicide; putting a partner down
and calling her names; making her think she is crazy; controlling what she does, who
she talks to, what she reads, where she goes; treating her like a servant; inhibiting
her from being involved in making any big decisions; acting like the “master of the
castle”; and other tactics that exploit male privilege. 128
These tactics create a condition of “unfreedom”—that is, “gendered in its
construction, delivery and consequence.”129 This state of unfreedom is called
entrapment.130 Importantly, physical violence may be used, but coercive control
does not require an element of physical violence.131 If violence is used at all, it is
typically minor violence.132 But because minor violence typifies both fights and
coercive control, these patterns can only be distinguished in a historical context
where the frequency of force over time is weighted alongside its interplay with
tactics to intimidate, isolate, or control.133 Stark concludes that “[w]omen’s
experience of feeling entrapped in a coercively controlling situation is elicited from
something other than violence, because the experience of feeling abused is

126.
Id. at 106 (explaining how professionals, including law enforcement, must
inquire about minor violence within “a historical context where the frequency of force over
time is weighed alongside its interplay with tactics to intimidate, isolate or control a partner .
. . [B]ut prevailing emphasis on discrete incidents makes these distinctions impossible . . . and
the most dangerous cases are then left at bay”).
127.
Id. at 369 (“Violations of liberty are the central moral wrong in coercive
control, regardless of whether violence is their means.”).
128.
These are taken from the “Power and Control Wheel” of the Domestic Abuse
Intervention Project. Power and Control Wheel, DOMESTIC ABUSE INTERVENTION PROJECT,
http://www.theduluthmodel.org/pdf/PowerandControl.pdf (last visited March 15, 2014).
129.
STARK, supra note 4, at 205.
130.
Id. (“The result [of coercive control] is a condition of unfreedom (what is
experienced as entrapment) that is ‘gendered’ in its construction, delivery and
consequence.”); see Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological
and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1295, 1318 (1993) (observing that Stark coined the term “entrapment” and arguing it best
summarizes the experience of battered women).
131.
STARK, supra note 4, at 367.
132.
Id. at 106 (“[M]inor violence typifies both fights and coercive control.”).
133.
Id. at 106–07
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independent of the frequency of abusive episodes, and is shared by women who
suffer relatively few assaults as well as by those who suffer hundreds.”134
Stark refers to entrapment as an enigma: “[W]omen who are no different
from any of us to start, who are statistically normal become ensconced in
relationships where ongoing violence is virtually inevitable.” He eloquently lays out
the case that it is the confluence of societal institutions that supports male privilege,
sexism, and an individual man who uses coercively controlling tactics. 135
Entrapment is “the unique experiential effect when structural exploitation,
regulation, and other controls are personalized.”136 As a result “entrapment . . . can
be significantly reduced only if sexual discrimination is addressed
simultaneously.”137
3. Johnson’s Typologies of IPV
Sociologist Michael Johnson also discerns between types of aggression
used in intimate relationships. Like Stark, Johnson recognizes a category of coercive
control that he calls “Coercively Controlling Violence,”138 and defines it quite
similarly to Stark. Johnson distinguishes three other typologies: (1) “Violent
Resistance,” which is violence that both men and women use in reaction to partners
who have a pattern of Coercive Controlling Violence for the purposes of getting the
latter to stop or to stand up for themselves;139 (2) “Situational-Couple Violence,” the
type of “partner violence that does not have its basis in the dynamic of power and
control”;140 and (3) “Separation-Instigated Violence,” a type of violence that first
occurs in the relationship at separation, related to the tensions and emotions that
arise in that context, but is not ongoing.141
Johnson and Stark disagree on two points germane to this Article. First,
Stark argues that Johnson’s category of situational violence does not sufficiently
distinguish between two dynamics with very different significance: the “ordinary
134.
Id. at 100 (citing Page Hall Smith et al., Women’s Experiences with Battering:
A Conceptualization from Qualitative Research, 5 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 173 (1995)); see
also Page Hall Smith et al., Measuring Battering: Development of the Women’s Experience
with Battering (WEB) Scale, 4 WOMEN’S HEALTH: RESEARCH ON GENDER, BEHAVIOR & POL’Y
273 (1995).
135.
STARK, supra note 4 at 113–14.
136.
Id. at 370.
137.
Id. at 14.
138.
Sometimes Johnson calls this type of IPV “intimate terrorism.” See, e.g.,
Michael P. Johnson, Differentiating Among Types of Domestic Violence, in MARRIAGE AND
FAMILY 282 (H. Elizabeth Peters & Claire M. Kamp Dush eds., 2009).
139.
Joan B. Kelly & Michael P. Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of Intimate
Partner Violence: Research Update and Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV.
476, 479 (2008).
140.
Id.
141.
Id. at 479–80. With regard to situational violence Johnson elaborates: “It is
often the case that Situational-Couple Violence continues through the separation process and
that Coercive Controlling Violence may continue or even escalate to homicidal levels when
the perpetrator feels his control is threatened by separation.” Id. at 480.
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fights that many couples view as legitimate ways to settle their differences, and frank
assaults where violence is used to hurt, frighten or subordinate a partner, but control
tactics are not.”142 Second, Stark emphasizes that targets of coercive control
experience entrapment; Johnson acknowledges, but does not emphasize, the
phenomenon of entrapment.143
Nonetheless, Johnson and Stark clearly agree upon several important
points. First, coercive control is a qualitatively different thing than the other forms
of aggression; they do not exist on a continuum.144 Thus, coercive control should be
measured on a different moral yardstick than other forms of aggression.145 Second,
in heterosexual relationships, men are the primary perpetrators of coercive
control.146

142.
STARK, supra note 4, at 104.
143.
See, e.g., Kelly & Johnson, supra note 139 (neglecting to use the word
“entrapment” in the text, but acknowledging elsewhere that women enduring coercively
controlling violence become entrapped). I rely more heavily on Stark’s typologies because to
my mind they are a degree more discerning, and because I believe that the experience of
entrapment, as I argue later, is critical to, and is critically misunderstood by society and law
and policy, changing attitudes and responses to IPV.
144.
Kelly & Johnson, supra note 139, at 485; STARK, supra note 4, at 104
(agreeing with Johnson, Stark writes: “A key implication of Johnson’s terminology is that
situational violence and intimate terrorism have different dynamics and qualitatively different
outcomes and so should be judged by different moral yardsticks. They also require a different
response. Abuse should no more be considered a simple extension of using force than a heart
attack should be treated as an extreme instance of heartburn”).
145.
STARK, supra note 4, at 104.
146.
Id. at 102 (“[T]he pattern of intimidation, isolation, and control . . . is unique
to men’s abuse of women and . . . is critical to explaining why women become entrapped in
abusive relationships in ways that men do not and experience abuse as ongoing. These tactics
do not typify all forms of abuse.”); Kelly & Johnson, supra note 139, at 481–82 (discussing
the results of various surveys and stating that coercively controlling violence is largely male
perpetrated). Regarding coercive control in same-sex relationships, STARK, supra note 4, at
396–97, discusses how, in his practice, he has worked with same-sex couples where
“perpetrators combined physical abuse with rituals of dominance, exploitation, isolation, and
humiliation that resembled the patterns evident in coercive control, relationships in which
there are rules for behavior in public, where one partner is forbidden to work or visit his or
her family, or where child care and/or homemaking are regulated”, and notes that stalking
and “other forms of intimidation used in coercive control are also common” but is careful to
note that there is no evidence in the literature yet that illuminates whether, if coercive control
occurs among same-sex couples, it has “the same dynamics, consequences, or spatial
dimensions or whether and how abusive dynamics are affected when race, class or age
differences form its core rather than differences in gender identity” because there is a dearth
of research. For recent empirical work regarding coercive control in same-sex relationships
see Andrew Franklin & Jac Brown, infra note 158 (describing dynamics similar to those stated
by Johnson) and Donovan & Hester, supra note 12, at 283–86 (describing dynamics similar
to those stated by Stark, adding that “outing” is used as a control tactic, and describing
expectations of people in first-time same-sex relationships who are at particular risk for IPV).
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Finally, and most importantly, large-scale, general population surveys have
not accurately captured the prevalence of coercive control.147 For example, Stark
observed that the National Violence Against Women Survey (“NVAWS”) fails to
distinguish between prevalence and incidence of abuse, and thus there is no way to
know for certain which cases of abuse identified in the study are ongoing.148 His
rough approximation, based on the data collected by the NVAWS and based upon
his own empirical research, is that somewhere between 6.6%–8.8% of women in the
U.S. experience coercive control.149 This number is much lower than what is oft
argued: that “one in five women” experience coercively controlling violence in their
relationships.150
Johnson also finds fault with the NVAWS, and recently re-analyzed its
results.151 He focused specifically on the data regarding ex-husbands’ (rather than
current husbands’) aggression.152 He predicted, and found, that when looking at this
group in particular, there was considerably more violence reported and especially
more coercively controlling violence. 153 Specifically, he found that in the “exspouse data,” 30% of ex-husbands were violent, and 7% of the reported violence by
ex-husbands qualified as Situational-Couple Violence and 22% qualified as
Coercively Controlling Violence.154 Johnson clarified that we “certainly would not
want to assume that [these rates] represent the relative prevalence of violence of
various types in intact marriages.”155 However, he argued that the little to no
coercively controlling violence reported by respondents in intact marriages might
be a result of the fact that “female victims of intimate terrorism in a current
relationship would be especially unlikely to agree to participate in survey research
on violence.”156
While Stark and Johnson do not agree on precise numbers, both are clear
that large-scale surveys such as the NVAWS fail to accurately capture the
prevalence of coercive control. This is important because, as will be discussed in
Subpart D, most people think of intimate partner violence as having to do with power

147.
Kelly & Johnson, supra note 139, at 481; STARK, supra note 4, at 88–90.
148.
Email from Evan Stark, February 26, 2014 (on file with author).
149.
Though he is careful to qualify that this estimation is very rough given other
methodological problems with the NVAWS. Id.
150.
See infra note 196 (discussing the number of scholars, including myself, who
have overgeneralized the prevalence of coercive control based on the National Violence
Against Women Survey).
151.
Michael P. Johnson et al., Intimate Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence
in General Surveys: Ex-Spouses Required, 20 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 186 (2014).
152.
Id. at 189.
153.
Id. at 192, 196.
154.
Id. at 196.
155.
Id. at 197.
156.
Id. at 201.
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and control,157 when in fact this dynamic refers to coercive control, which comprises
only a fraction of the reports of aggression between intimate partners.158
C. Conflating All IPV with Coercive Control is a Barrier to Understanding Love
Matters in the Context of IPV
Practitioners, researchers, policymakers, and the law use the term “IPV” to
mean different things.159 As this Article has demonstrated, there is a wide array of
conduct that qualifies as IPV, ranging from any use of physical force, to fights, to
assaults, to coercive control. Also, in nonabusive relationships, love is deemed a
legitimate factor in decisions to stay in relationships, but in abusive relationships,
love is not considered to be a legitimate factor.
Based on the work of Stark and Johnson, I join those scholars who argue
that the line between abusive and nonabusive relations should be drawn at coercive
control, or at least closer to it. When discrete assaults are viewed in context, with an
examination of the intent of the perpetrator and the effect on the target, a distinction
can be drawn between episodic assault and coercive control.
This is not to argue, as a normative matter, that an episodic assault—
particularly one in which there is a serious injury and in which the victim feels
violated—should not be deemed criminal.160 Rather, an episodic assault is distinct
in kind and degree from an assault that is part and parcel of an ongoing pattern of
tactics designed to diminish the autonomy and personhood of an intimate, or
formerly intimate, partner. The latter is more severe and, as a number of scholars
have persuasively argued, should be treated differently by the law.161

157.
Kelly & Johnson, supra note 139, at 478 (describing the National Domestic
Violence Hotline definition, which discusses a pattern of behavior used to gain power and
control, and stating that this is the definition “that comes to mind for most people when they
hear terms such as wife beating, battering, spousal abuse, or domestic violence.”).
158.
Very recent research does indeed support the conclusion that SituationalCouple Violence is far more common than coercive control. See, e.g., Andrew Franklin & Jac
Brown, Coercive Control in Same-Sex Intimate Partner Violence, 29 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE 15,
20 (2014) (finding very low rates of intimate terrorism—4.6%—consistent with Johnson’s
research with regard to heterosexual couples); see also Janele M. Leone et al., Women’s
Decisions to Not Seek Formal Help for Partner Violence: A Comparison of Intimate
Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence, 29 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1850, 1858
(2014) (finding of the sample of women labeled “abused,” 34% were characterized as victims
of intimate terrorism and 66% as victims of Situational-Couple Violence).
159.
See Kelly & Johnson, supra note 139, at 477–78.
160.
Assaults are crimes, whether perpetrated on an intimate partner, a family
member, or a stranger. But an assault on a partner that is situational in nature and not part of
a pattern of coercive control may not merit treatment as a crime of IPV, which would include
the issuance of a mandatory criminal protection order and application of no-drop prosecution
policies. See supra discussion Part II.B.2.
161.
See infra Part IV and infra text accompanying note 210 (discussing Alafair
Burke’s and Deborah Tuerkheimer’s definitions).
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Moving the line from any use of physical force toward coercive control
would allow people162 who consider themselves to be in nonabusive partnerships
some emotional and cognitive space. Space to acknowledge that their relationships
might not be so different from many intimate relationships that could be classified
(as a legal matter) as relationships marked by IPV. Martha Mahoney argued that,
when we view others’ relationships and hear about incidents of violence, we are
shocked and consider those women to be battered women.163 Yet when we think of
instances of aggression in our own relationships, we think of them as normal parts
of the relationship and, accordingly, oft implicitly, do not (or would not) consider
ourselves victims of IPV.164 If coercive control was the litmus test for what is and is
not abusive, instead of the use of physical force, this might allow us the space to
conceptualize love as a legitimate factor in the majority of abused women’s
decisions to stay.
But, what about love in the context of coercive control? When women are
coercively controlled, and hence entrapped, as Stark argues, is what these women
feel for their partners love?
Donovan and Hester argue that love, which is usually positively
experienced, can serve to confuse victims about how to make sense of and name
their experiences as abusive.165 If, as in the case of coercive control, the abusive
partner makes all of the rules in the relationship—this relationship serves me, and
you are responsible for this relationship and for me 166—the love women feel may be
a response to the coercive control itself, in which the abusive partner’s “practice of
love” is a form of emotional violence.167
In these instances, and in the context of coercive control, “love” is not the
same as most of us would define it. Recall that, although defining love has proven
difficult to both the public at large and to social scientists in particular, one of the
points upon which there is agreement is the notion of mutuality.168 A unidirectional
love in a context of domination and subjugation is a type of love that most of us
question.
Stark does not. He explicitly views the capacity to love an abusive partner
as a strength and not a weakness, and the cultivation of the capacity for love as a
way to liberate oneself, at least emotionally.169 “The ‘love’ women feel may have as
much to do with them, keeping their positive emotions and possibilities alive, their
162.
By people, I mean to include the general public as well as the same in their
roles as judges, lawyers, jurors, policymakers, and law enforcement personnel.
163.
Mahoney, supra note 7, at 15–16.
164.
Id.
165.
Donovan & Hester, supra note 12, at 282.
166.
Id. at 282–83 (describing the rules of relationship set forth by perpetrators of
coercive control).
167.
Id. at 283.
168.
See supra Part I.A.
169.
Email from Evan Stark, March 13, 2013 (on file with author) (“I see a woman
loving an abusive partner as a strength, not a weakness, a 'test' of love if you will—isn't this
what 'for better or worse' also means (not just in 'sickness and health’).”).
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autonomy, as with the person they’re attached to, and, to this extent, is an example
of what I call ‘control in the context of no control.’”170 Donovan and Hester similarly
argue, based upon their empirical data, that victims of coercive control use the love
they feel to construct themselves as strong and to view their love as a source of
strength.171 Love, in the ways that both Stark, and Donovan and Hester describe, is
not merely a strength but a survival mechanism.
Whether one views love as a source of strength, with a more expansive
view of the multiple and distinct contexts within which violence between partners
and love coexist, we can better consider, assess, and understand the value and
meaning of love in all contexts. Acknowledging the existence and complexity of
love, and victims’ experience of love, across contexts affords the opportunity that
the law currently misses. At the very least, acknowledging the complexity of love in
a continuum of relationships (from nonabusive to coercively controlling) tempers a
knee-jerk reaction to love in the context of abuse as crazy or masochistic.

III. HOW FEMINIST LEGAL SCHOLARS UNWITTINGLY
CONTRIBUTE TO BINARY NOTIONS
A. Errors Caused by Conflating IPV with Coercive Control
For several years now, sociologist Michael Johnson has argued that it is
critical to discern between the types of force and violence we are talking about. In
2008, he wrote: “[I]t is no longer considered scientifically or ethically acceptable to
speak of domestic violence without specifying the type of partner violence to which
one refers.”172
There are two primary groups of researchers who are interested in
quantifying the prevalence of intimate partner violence. One group is comprised of
family sociologists, while the other is comprised of feminist researchers. 173 These
two groups measure IPV quite differently. Family sociologists focus on discrete
episodes of physical force, finding that men and women commit acts of violence in
intimate relationships at largely the same rate. 174 Feminist researchers, on the other
hand, focus on the context and intent of the use of violence, finding that women are
overwhelmingly the victims of violence used to secure power and control in
relationships—the type that most closely resembles what Stark and Johnson call
coercive control.175
Failure to be discerning results in significant errors—when researchers
lump together differing types of IPV they “produce data that are an ‘average’ of the
170.
Id.
171.
See supra Introduction.
172.
Kelly & Johnson, supra note 139, at 477.
173.
Id.; STARK, supra note 4, at 84.
174.
Kelly & Johnson, supra note 139, at 477.
175.
Id.; STARK, supra note 4, at 103–04 (noting that feminist researchers insist the
problem requiring public attention involves female victims almost exclusively); id. at 104
(crediting Johnson for first observing that the two groups were measuring different
phenomena).
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characteristics or correlates of the types that are aggregated.”176 Johnson gives the
example of studies on the effect of intergenerational transmission of IPV.177 It is
commonly claimed that if IPV occurs in a man’s home when he is a boy, he learns
that using violence against one’s partner is appropriate.178 Johnson notes that
researchers have yet to distinguish between types of violence when conducting their
studies.179 Thus the “average” violent relationship, in “most survey research,
dominated by situational-couple violence, does not represent the relationship that is
usually of most interest, the effect of childhood experiences on the likelihood of a
man becoming a wife-beater [a coercively controlling violent partner].”180
Second, Johnson argues, “[S]ometimes research that deals with one type of
[IPV] is used to draw conclusions about quite a different type.”181 Here he gives the
example of a researcher who based her finding—that as many women are coercively
controlling as men—on data from general survey samples that measured situational
violence.182 Of this mistake he observed: “This is the error that produced decadeslong and continuing debate over the gender symmetry of domestic violence. We
need to differentiate among types of IPV if we want to advance our understanding
of such violence and to intervene effectively.”183
B. Examples of Errors in Feminist Legal Scholarship on IPV
Turning to the legal scholarship regarding IPV, a number of scholars,
including myself, are guilty of lumping together rather than discerning amongst
types of aggression in intimate partnerships.184
As one recent example, in Breakups, Deborah Tuerkheimer brilliantly
argues that the law fails to recognize many women who are in abusive relationships
as victims of ongoing abuse; rather it imposes a prerequisite of geographic and
emotional distance between parties—a breakup—before condemning stalking as a
crime.185 Her article is the first to examine how relationship status (pre- or postbreakup) is dispositive of whether stalking will be deemed a crime. I could not agree
more with the main thrust of the article, which questions why a pattern of harassing,
intimidating, and threatening conduct is criminalized only after the parties have
separated, when in fact this conduct most commonly predates physical separation.

176.
Johnson, supra note 138, at 283.
177.
Id.
178.
Id.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.
181.
Id.
182.
Id. (discussing the research conducted by Suzanne Stenmetz in the late 1970s).
183.
Id. at 284.
184.
See GOODMARK, supra note 2, at 146, 146–50 (after describing the lumpingtogether, or essentializing of victims, Goodmark poignantly argues that feminist legal
scholars have also essentialized IPV by characterizing IPV as always revolving around power
and control, and that by essentializing both IPV and the men who perpetrate it, the legal
system endangers women who are likely to stay with or return to their partners).
185.
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Breakups, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 72 (2013).
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But the article also contributes to the problems previously highlighted: (1)
the assumption that there is a commonly shared definition of IPV, which she
identifies as coercive control;186 (2) the implication that most victims of intimate
partner violence experience coercive control; and (3) the use of statistics that
describe one type of IPV to draw conclusions about another.
Tuerkheimer begins her article by asserting that the “most commonplace
violence” is violence between intimate partners, and cites the first National Intimate
Partner and Sexual Violence Survey (“NIPSVS”) for the premise that “more than
one in three women in the United States has ‘experienced rape, physical violence,
and/or stalking by an intimate partner in their lifetime.’”187 She then argues,
“[u]nlike other violence, intimate partner violence is not episodic, nor is it limited
to the realm of the physical. Incidents of acute battering are connected by dynamics
of power and control.”188 The implication is that “more than one in three” women
found to have experienced rape, physical violence, and/or stalking are currently
victims of coercively controlling violence.189
But this is not the case. This particular measure (of “rape, physical
violence, and/or stalking”) does not necessarily reveal a pattern of behavior, but
episodes or incidents of behaviors—precisely what Tuerkheimer argues is not a
proper measure of abuse.190 Surveys, like NIPSVS, confuse incidence with
prevalence of IPV.191 In addition, they focus on physical aggression, rather than the
nonphysical control tactics that define coercive control.192
As evidence of the latter point, the survey found that one in four men in the
United States have experienced rape, physical violence, and/or stalking by an
intimate partner in their lifetime. 193 We know, based on the work of Stark and of
Johnson, that this statistic cannot represent the number of men who are coercively
controlled; indeed, Stark reports knowing of no documented case in which a woman
coercively controlled a male intimate partner. 194
186.
Id. at 55 (“Domestic violence, also known as battering, intimate partner
violence, intimate partner abuse, or simply abuse, is a pattern of violent conduct predicated
on power and control.”). Tuerkheimer distinguishes this definition from the “common usages
of the terms stalking and domestic violence, which the criminal law perpetuates.” Id. at 54.
187.
Id. at 52, n.1.; According to 2011 figures from the first National Intimate
Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, more than one in three women in the United States has
‘experienced rape, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner in their lifetime.’
MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL
INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 2 (2011).
188.
Tuerkheimer, supra note 185, at 52.
189.
See BLACK ET AL., supra note 187, at 2.
190.
Id. (“When it is embedded in a relationship, violence spans time. Unlike other
violence, intimate partner violence is not episodic, nor is it limited to the realm of the
physical.”).
191.
STARK, supra note 4, at 107–08.
192.
Kelly & Johnson, supra note 139, at 481–82.
193.
BLACK ET AL., supra note 187, at 2.
194.
STARK, supra note 4, at 377. But see Johnson et al., supra note 151, at 202
(finding that “[d]ata regarding ex-spouses show that intimate terrorism is primarily but not
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Prior to the NIPSVS survey, the most recent large-scale national survey
was the National Violence Against Women Survey. 195 In my prior work, based on
this survey, I have misstated statistics about coercive control.196 I am in good
company.197
exclusively male-perpetrated”); see also Kelly & Johnson, supra note 139, at 482 (noting that
there may be some cases in which women coercively control men, but that as of the date of
this observation, the paucity of research could not lead to any conclusive evidence).
195.
PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THEONNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT,
NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE (2000), available at
http//ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf.
196.
See Tamara L. Kuennen, Recognizing the Right to Petition for Victims of
Domestic Violence, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 839 (2012) (citing to the NVAWS, I argued
that the “vast majority of [IPV] victims do not report the violence to the police” without
differentiating amongst types of IPV. In fact, victims of coercive control versus victims of
other types of IPV are more likely to call the police); Leone et al., supra note 158, at 1862
(finding that “70.2% of intimate terrorism victims sought some type of formal help versus
44.4% of situational couple violence victims”).
197.
See Joanne Belknap et al., The Roles of Phones and Computers in Threatening
and Abusing Women Victims of Male Intimate Partner Abuse, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y
373, 384–85 (2012) (citing the NVAWS and arguing that most victims do not call the police,
without differentiating amongst types of IPV); Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence As A
Crime of Pattern and Intent: An Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
552, 569 (2007) (citing to the NVAWS and arguing that generally, domestic violence is often
driven by coercive control); Michelle Byers, What Are the Odds: Applying the Doctrine of
Chances to Domestic-Violence Prosecutions in Massachusetts, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 551,
554 (2012) (citing to the NVAWS and arguing that both men and women who are victims of
IPV are continually abused by the same perpetrator, without differentiating amongst the types
of IPV); Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the
Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 48 (2004)
(citing to the NVAWS, arguing that the majority of intimate partner assaults are not reported
to authorities because a majority of victims thought that the police “would not or could not
do anything on their behalf,” without differentiating amongst types of IPV); Angela M.
Killian, Mandatory Minimum Sentences Coupled with Multi-Facet Interventions: An
Effective Response to Domestic Violence, 6 U. D.C. L. REV. 51, 69 (2001) (citing to the
NVAWS, stating that a “victim of intimate partner violence is nothing more than a prisoner
of her abuser[,]” without differentiating amongst types of IPV); Tom Lininger, The Sound of
Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 868
(2009) (discussing control as a primary motive behind IPV and citing the NVAWS to show
that women who are victims of IPV tend to suffer at the hands of repeat offenders); Tanya M.
Marcum & Catherine Davies Hoort, Alert: Be on the Lookout for Protection Orders in the
Educational Setting, 30 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 39, 49 (2013) (citing to the NVAWS, stating
that “many victims of intimate partner violence do not obtain protection orders[,]” without
differentiating amongst types of IPV); Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for
Indefinite Domestic Violence Protection Orders, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1067 (2014) (citing
to the NVAWS, arguing that “[a]lthough protection order holders generally experience an
overall decrease in violence, multiple studies have still found high rates of protection order
violations by abusive partners[,]” without differentiating amongst types of IPV); Lawyers and
Domestic Violence: Part I, 24 WYO. LAW. 36, 37 (Oct. 2001) (citing to the NVAWS, stating
that most violence is never reported to law enforcement and “remains shrouded behind the
veil of family privacy[,]” without differentiating amongst types of IPV).
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I fear that these overestimations have a snowball effect because when we
fail to discern coercive control from other forms of IPV we overstate its prevalence.
By overstating its prevalence, we inadvertently imply not only that all women who
experience IPV are coercively controlled but also that all women are entrapped in
their relationships. This is particularly problematic because of the connotations of
the word “entrapment.”
For Stark, entrapment is about the confluence of a sexist society and the
control tactics of an individual man.198 For the public, however, entrapment connotes
an individual woman who is frozen, paralyzed, and helpless. 199 She would leave her
partner if only she could, if only she had the resources and the strength. Police,
judges, lawyers, advocates, social workers, friends, neighbors, and family can
provide her the necessary support, resources, and strength.200 They can help
entrapped women by helping them leave. 201 Leaving, then, is the only solution.
When women love their partners and do not want to leave, they are not only viewed
as aberrant, they are also not believed.202 This act of denying them their own agency
and autonomy would seem to conflict with feminist principles.
In sum, the importance of discerning the type of IPV that feminist legal
scholars and advocates in the field wish to eradicate cannot be overstated. As
eloquently put by Stark:
Accurate numbers are imperative not merely to retain support from
an increasingly skeptical public but because a vast service
infrastructure is in place that cannot function properly without them.
If before it made little difference if we were standing in empirical
quicksand . . . today accurate numbers are needed to determine how
many personnel to enlist, what resources to allocate, whom to target
for service and interdiction, and when, where, and how to intervene
to maximize effectiveness. No one is harmed more seriously by the
absence of agreement on the what, who, and how much of battering
than its victims. If once talking about an anonymous mass, we now
bear responsibility for millions of real people for whom a range of
public or quasi-public institutions must be held accountable, billions
in public and private dollars that could arguably be spent with greater
effect elsewhere, and the investment of millions of person hours

198.
See supra Part II.B.2.c.
199.
GOODMARK, supra note 2, at 33 (describing the lingering influence of Lenore
Walker’s theory of learned helplessness and the damage it has wrought).
200.
Id. at 81 (describing in detail the conflation of separation with successful
termination as having oriented domestic-violence policy and law since the early days of the
Battered Women’s Movement and arguing how law and policy development within the legal
system unequivocally prioritizes separation as the only clear remedy to ending domestic
violence).
201.
Id. at 59 (describing Walker’s theory of learned helplessness as the first step
toward defining women as passive and ineffectual, and too fearful to act to stop the violence).
202.
Id. at 66–69 (describing skepticism of professionals when women do not act
in conformity with stereotypes of victims as passive and desirous of leaving).
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annually by real advocates, police, judges, physicians, psychologists,
and social workers.203

IV. IF MATTERS OF LOVE REALLY MATTERED
A. Advantages
To avail themselves of the law’s current protection, abused women are
required to sever their intimate relations.204 If the law valued love more, and
separation less, both the criminal law governing IPV and the civil legal remedies
available to women could be profoundly impacted. 205
Currently, the criminal law fails to recognize many women who are in
abusive relations as victims of abuse. As discussed earlier, in Breakups, Deborah
Tuerkheimer compellingly argued this point.206 If a woman has not broken up with
her partner, she is perceived to be consenting to, if not desirous of the calls, texts,
following, and other forms of communication that constitute stalking.207 If the law
placed a higher premium on protection within the context of love, rather than
separation, a pattern of harassing, intimidating, and threatening conduct would be
deemed criminal regardless of whether the parties had separated. Given that stalking
conduct tends to predate physical separation, removing the separation requirement
would also better protect victims.
Civil restraining orders, called “protection orders,” prohibit a respondent
from assaulting, harassing, and menacing the petitioner. These orders are the most
widely used legal remedy by victims of IPV. As a practical matter, victims can only
obtain such orders if they have broken up with their partners, because these orders
typically prohibit any contact whatsoever from the respondent. Therefore, these
orders are not a viable remedy if the petitioner is not ready or does not want to

203.
STARK, supra note 4, at 87.
204.
As I have observed previously, the law provides a one-size-fits-all approach
to IPV: separation of the parties. See Kuennen, Relational Contract, supra note 78, at n.418
and accompanying text. See also GOODMARK, supra note 2, at 81 (arguing that separation is
a litmus test for determining whether a victim is worthy of assistance, and quoting Christine
Littleton, supra note 15: “[The legal system] does not blame all battered women for their
plight, only those who do not immediately sever their relationships and leave their
batterers.”).
205.
Baker, supra note 82, at 1478 (arguing that if the law took seriously the value
of intimacy and relationships, this could have a concrete doctrinal impact for women
experiencing abuse).
206.
Tuerkheimer, supra text accompanying note 185.
207.
Id. at 72 (observing that “[t]hough the violent exercise of power and control
occurs in virtually seamless fashion throughout the stages of relationship, women must leave
in order for criminal law to take note. In functional terms, what this means is that prosecutors,
perhaps anticipating the reaction of jurors to more imaginative charging decisions, charge
defendants with stalking for exclusively post-separation conduct, despite the technical
applicability of stalking laws to domestic violence”).
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terminate her relationship. If the law valued love more, and separation less, these
orders could be tailored to allow contact but prohibit abuse.208
Similarly, criminal protection orders should be tailored to value love as
well. These are injunctions that are automatically issued against defendants
criminally charged with committing an act of IPV.209 As with most civil protection
orders, criminal protection orders prohibit all contact between the alleged
perpetrator and victim. As Jeannie Suk argued, the issuance of these orders
constitutes state-imposed, de facto divorce, wreaking havoc in the lives not just of
women who love their partners and want to preserve their relationships, but of men
who want the same but are subject to criminal conviction for remaining in contact
with the victim. 210
Finally, a number of scholars have argued for a more discerning definition
of IPV that would target coercive control. 211 Rather than viewing IPV as discrete
episodes of violence that occur between current and former intimate partners, the
criminal law should instead condemn the pattern of ongoing threats and
intimidation—both physical and nonphysical—that comprise coercive control. For
the reasons stated in Part III, such a definition acknowledges the distinction between
an ongoing strategy of subjugation that is not consistent with community norms
versus sporadic fights which frequently occur in the context of intimate love.
Social-service interventions could also be impacted by acknowledging the
existence of love in the context of IPV, rather than ignoring it. If love, and not
financial, housing, or other external needs, prevents women who would otherwise
leave their relationships from doing so, then perhaps the social-service interventions
available may not be entirely sufficient.212 For example, women experiencing abuse
could be counseled about the fact that feelings of love are normal. This would help
women decrease feelings of shame and secrecy about the fact that love is a salient
factor, particularly for many women who have recently left their partners. 213 As one
woman commented, social-service providers “[d]on’t tell you how to go back and
deal with the person and I bet you nine out of ten of them go back, end up seeing the
person again because you’re not learning how to deal with it at the time, you’re
learning how to run away.”214

208.
Goldfarb, supra note 75.
209.
See Suk, supra note 2, at 48.
210.
Id. at 56.
211.
GOODMARK, supra note 2, at 139; Burke, supra note 10; Erskine, supra note
10; Tuerkheimer, supra note 10.
212.
Griffing et al., supra note 71, at 307 (“Despite the increasing availability of
concrete services such as shelter and economic assistance, the frequency with which women
still return to abusive relationships is considerable. This suggests that in some cases these
resources, although necessary, may not be an entirely sufficient component of intervention
programs for battered women.”).
213.
Id. at 314–15.
214.
GOODMARK, supra note 2, at 99 (citation omitted) (quoting a woman who
sought outside assistance).
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More broadly, social-service providers could measure their success in
terms of empowering women to make the choices that are right for them, rather than
encouraging separation as the only solution. 215 “Some battered women wish to
maintain the relationships’ positive attributes while finding a way to stop or lessen
the abuse. Facilitating women’s freedom of choice as a mechanism for
empowerment implies accepting and respecting their choice to stay with their abuser
as a viable alternative.”216 Thus far, social-service interventions give lip service to
empowerment as an important guiding principle, but the concept “seldom is carried
out beyond the ideological and prescriptive levels.”217
B. Risks
It is indisputable that there are risks involved when asking the law to
consider love in the context of intimate partner violence. Any such movement must
be cautiously approached, particularly at a time when the State seems willing to
restrict women’s choices about terminating pregnancy, about sexual orientation, and
about marriage—though the latter appears to be changing.218 There is the question
of a retreat by the state to the notion that IPV is a private, family matter that the state
has no business interfering with.219 There is fear of “modernized masochism”220—if
women love their abusive partners, how do we explain this? And there is resistance
to the notion of condoning any violence on any level between any parties. 221
In addition, there is the possibility that the law will not get it right:
[A] central concern of women’s advocates is that research
differentiating among types of intimate partner violence will lead to
the reification or misapplication of typologies and that battering will,
as a result, be missed—with potentially lethal results. Advocates also
fear that typical information available to the court for decision
making is too limited to make effective distinctions and that effective
screening processes and appropriate assessment tools are not
available or in place.222

For all of these reasons, as stated in the Introduction to this Article: “How
could we possibly take seriously women’s accounts of love and hope without
undermining the little protection from male violence women have been able to wrest
215.
Id. at 26 (arguing that social-service providers have, because of government
grant requirements, changed their mission from helping women develop their own strategies
for coping with abuse to encouraging women to leave their relationships).
216.
Peled et al., supra note 63, at 13.
217.
Id. at 12.
218.
See STARK, supra note 4, at 364 (discussing proceeding with caution, but
encouraging the act of proceeding).
219.
See Kuennen, Relational Contracts, supra note 78 (discussing the historical
treatment of domestic violence as a private, family matter in which the law has no business
intervening).
220.
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 185, at 94.
221.
See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, supra note 97, at 118 (advocating for the elimination of
all violence).
222.
Kelly & Johnson, supra note 139, at 478.
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from the legal system, without indeed increasing our already overwhelming
vulnerability?”223
But we must remember that a fundamental tenet of feminism, if not the
fundamental tenet, is listening to women’s voices.224 Catharine MacKinnon
described listening to and believing what women say as the “methodological secret”
of feminism.225 If women are saying loud and clear that they value love, that what
they want is to be safe in their relationships, and that what they do not want is to
“just leave” their relationships,226 how could feminist scholars not take women’s
accounts of love seriously?

CONCLUSION
In this Article, I demonstrated that love matters to women in abusive
relationships. I argued that, consequently, matters of love should mean something
to both the legal regime redressing IPV and to feminist legal scholars seeking reform
of IVP as a legal concept. But that currently love does not matter.
Specifically, I attempted to connect some dots. I argued that feminist legal
scholars fail to be sufficiently specific about the type of IPV we wish to target.
Instead, in our scholarship and arguments, we conflate coercive control with all
forms of IPV, when in fact coercive control is but a fraction of what the law calls
IPV. As a result, feminist legal scholars have contributed to: binary notions of what
constitutes IPV, the unsettled question of who is a deserving victim, and the
constitution and dynamics of intimate relationships generally (nonabusive versus
abusive).
These dichotomies mystify, rather than illuminate, the complexity of
intimate love as a context in which harm can occur. They make the coexistence of
love and abuse something “other,” distant from feminist legal scholars our
relationships, and the law.227 And as a result, the legal response feminists have
crafted views women who wish to preserve relationships with partners they love as
not credible, blameworthy, and masochistic.
Currently, abused women who love their partners have no meaningful
access to civil legal remedies and no voice in criminal prosecution. Unwittingly,
feminist legal scholars and activists contributed to this problem. It is understandable
why, 30 years ago, consideration of love might have been a barrier to enactment of
223.
See Littleton, supra note 15, at 47.
224.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 63, at 71–73 (discussing the importance of accounting
for women’s particular experiences when crafting law and policy).
225.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW 5 (1987).
226.
Baker, supra note 82, at 1472 (“[Women] do not necessarily want to be in a
position where they can just leave. They want to be in relationships in which they forgive.
They may even want to be in relationships that involve some relinquishment of self,
autonomy, and power.”) (internal citations omitted).
227.
This was the thrust of Martha Mahoney’s ground-breaking article. See
Mahoney, supra note 7, at 15 (explaining how we view fights, conflicts, and even abusive
incidents in our own relationships as part of the throes of the relationship, whereas when we
hear a client tell us of an incident, we think of the client as “abused”).
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legal remedies that would be responsive to the problem of IPV. Now, however, when
women are consistently and repeatedly expressing desire for love and safety, there
is a clear call for feminist legal scholars and activists to account for love.

